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Gershman: Term Limits

THE TERM LIMITS CASE
Leon Lazer:
Now that term limits have been mentioned, we will get a little
more detailed discussion of the Term Limits Case. To speak to us
on that subject, we have Professor Bennett L. Gershman of Pace
Law School, a scholar of very distinguished background and also
one who has rendered public service, so I suppose he has a
somewhat experienced view of term limits. He has written two
books. He came to my attention when I saw what I thought was
an excellent article in the New York Law Journal on the question
of term limits and also on gun control. Of course, I thought it
was one which I agreed with, but in any event, we now have the
pleasure of his company and the education he will give us.
Professor Gershman.
ProfessorBennett L. Gershman:*
It is a pleasure to be here. The revival of the Tenth
Amendment 1 to counter various exercises of national power has
been one of the preeminent themes of the Supreme Court's recent
jurisprudence. Once regarded as a mere "truism" that reflected a
governmental balance of power decidedly favoring the federal
government, the Tenth Amendment, as interpreted by the Court's
current majority, has produced a radical transformation toward
broader state sovereignty over matters that previously seemed
reasonably well-settled as within Congress' prerogative. 2 Indeed,
the majority's somewhat tendentious "states' rights" rhetoric puts

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law
1. U.S. CONST. amend X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
2. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (rejecting
contention that the Tenth Amendment is merely a truism and stating that if a
power is attributable to state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment,
then it is not a power conferred on Congress) (citing United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
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this group of Justices in lockstep with the so-called Conservative
3
Revolution and the Republican Party's Contract With America.

. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,4 a bare majority,
formed only because one of the Court's strong Tenth Amendment
proponents decided to switch camps, 5 rejected an iconoclastic
interpretation of the Constitution that, if accepted, would have
dramatically altered the way America governs itself by judicial
construction. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court held that

"[a]llowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for
congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers'
vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people
of the United States."6

The idea of term limits for elected government officials is
hardly new. States have imposed term limits on their own elected
officials from the time of our Nation's founding. 7 This political

3. See 141 CONG. REC. H182 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995) (Statement of
Rep. Fox). The Contract with America states in pertinent part:
Mr. Speaker, our Contract With America states on the first day of
Congress a Republican House will force Congress to live under the
same laws as everyone else, cut one-third of committee staffs, and cut
the congressional budget. We have done that.
In the next 93 days we will vote on the following 10 items:
Ten. Congressional term limits to make Congress a citizen legislature.
This is our Contract with America.
Id.
4. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
5. Compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1873
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Tihe National Government is and must be
controlled by the people without collateral interference by the States."). with
U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The
statute now before us forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising
their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and
expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.").
6. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1845.
7. Id. at 1866, n.38. See Michael Slackman, Standard Pataki State
Address a FamiliarCallfor Cuts in Spending, Taxes, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1995,
at A7. The present governor of New York, George Pataki, has proposed term
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movement has produced one major constitutional amendment
relating to national office -- the Twenty Second Amendment, 8

which limits the office of President to two four-year terms. 9
Attempts by a substantial number of states to alter the
qualifications for members of Congress, however, have
encountered resistance by the courts. Indeed, at the time U.S.
Tenn Limits was argued, no appellate court had endorsed any
state effort, either by legislation or state constitutional
amendment, to place limits on the number of terms that U.S.
Senators or Representatives may serve. 10 Until recently, it
appeared that courts and scholars were virtually unanimous in
believing that the Constitution is unambiguous in establishing the
fixed and exclusive qualifications for members of Congress
relating to age, citizenship, and residency, and that only a
1
constitutional amendment could alter those requirements. I
In U.S. Term Limits, the Court reviewed an amendment to the
Arkansas Constitution, adopted in 1992, that made a candidate
for the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives ineligible to
have his or her name placed on the ballot for national election if
that person had previously been elected to three or more terms as
a member of the House, or two or more terms as a member of
the Senate.12 Following a taxpayer's complaint seeking
declaratory relief, the state circuit court held that this amendment
violated the Qualifications Clauses in Article I, sections 2 and 3,
limits for statewide officeholders such as the governor, comptroller, and
attorney general, but not for legislators. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend XXII. The Twenty Second Amendment states in
pertinent part: "No person shall be elected to the office of the President more
than twice... ." Id.

9. Id.
10. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1852.

11. See Mark R. Kellenbeck and Steve Sheppard, Another Such Victory?
Term Limits, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to

Representation, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1141 (1994).
12. ARK. CONST. amend. 73, § 2(a). Section 2(a) states in pertinent part:
"No member of the Arkansas House of Representatives may serve more than
three such two year terms." Id.; ARK. CoNsT. amend. 73, § 2(b). Section 2(b)
states in pertinent part: "No member of the Arkansas Senate may serve more
than three such two year terms." Id.
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of the U.S. Constitution. 13 The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed, in a five to two decision, with a plurality declaring that
states have no authority to change, add, or diminish the
requirements for congressional service enumerated in the
Qualifications Clauses. 14 Such piecemeal restrictions by states,
explained the plurality, would conflict with the interest of the
drafters of the Constitution in qualification uniformity, since
congressional representatives address national issues that affect
the citizens of every state. 15
The dissent argued from the premise that all political power
emanates from the people, and that since the Qualifications
Clauses contain no express or implicit restriction on a state's
ability to impose additional qualifications on candidates for
Congress, the people have the power to impose such restrictions
through a state constitutional amendment. 16 Moreover, according
to the dissent, the amendment did not alter any qualifications; it
merely constituted a permissible ballot-access restriction. 17
Writing for the majority. Justice Stevens began his discussion
by referring to the Court's seminal decision in Powell v.
McCormack, 18 in which the Court reviewed the history and text
13. See U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1846 (citing
unreported decision of Arkansas Circuit Court for Pulaski County); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. This clause states: "No Person shall be a
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years,
and have been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. cl. 3. This section provides: "No person shall be a
Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty Years. and been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Id.
14. U. S. Tenn Limits, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994).

15. Id. at 265 ("Additional age restrictions, residency requirements, or
sundry experience criteria established by the states would cause variances in
this uniformity and lead to an imbalance among the states with respect to who
can sit on Congress.").
16. Id. at 1875 (arguing that "where the Constitution is silent, it raises no
bar to action by the States or the people") (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 1885.
18. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that the House of Representatives has no
power to exclude a member-elect who meets the Constitution's membership
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of the Qualifications Clauses. Powell, Justice Stevens noted,
traced the British experience with qualifications for membership
in Parliament, and concluded that on the eve of the Constitutional
Convention, qualifications for membership in Parliament were
fixed, leading the Framers of the Constitution to conclude that
the qualifications for membership in Congress should also be
fixed and exclusive.19 Compelling evidence of the Framers'
intent that qualifications are "fixed and unalterable" is found in
20
the writings of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.
Concurring with this view, Justice Joseph Story in his respected
Commentaries on the Constitution 21 drew upon the maxim
expressio unius exclusio alterius22 to suggest that the affirmation
of the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence "would
23
seem to imply a negative of all others."
Powell also relied on the fundamental principle of our
democratic system that "the people should choose whom they
please to govern them." 24 This principle, according to the
majority, incorporates two other fundamental ideas: the
egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected should be
open to all persons of merit, and the postulate that sovereignty is
vested in the people, conferring on the people the right to freely
choose their representatives to the National Government. 25

requirements). Adam Clayton Powell (1908-1972) was a clergyman, politician,

and Member of the United States House of Representatives from 1945-67 and
1969-71 (D-N.Y.). WEBSTER'S NEW BIOGRAPHIcrAL DICTIONARY 814 (1983).

19. 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1848-49 ("English precedent stood for the
proposition that 'the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of
members to serve in parliament' and those qualifications were 'not occasional
but fixed.'").
20. Id. at 1849.
21. 1

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES

(3d ed. 1858).

22. "A maxim of statutory expression meaning that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed.
1990).

23. 1 STORY, § 625 at 433-34.
24. Powell, 395 U.S. at 541.
25. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S.Ct. at 1851.
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Although Powell conclusively resolved the issue of whether
Congress has the power to impose additional qualifications, it did
not necessarily resolve the separate question of whether the
Constitution prohibits states from imposing additional
qualifications. Justice Stevens noted that every federal and state
court hearing the issue had struck down a state's attempt to add
qualifications for membership in Congress.26 Notwithstanding
such unanimity, the majority was required to address, for the
first time, the currently fashionable Tenth Amendment argument
that each state has a reserved power to place additional
restrictions on the choices its voters may make. The majority
decisively rejected the Tenth Amendment challenge for two
independent reasons. First, the power to add qualifications is not
within the original powers of the states and thus is not reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment. 2 7 Second, the Court
argued that even if the states possessed some original power to
add qualifications, the Framers intended the Constitution to be
the exclusive source of qualifications for membership in
Congress, and thus "divested" the states of any power to add
qualifications 28
The crucial distinction, according to the majority, is between
the people as members of the nation and the people as members
of a state: "[T]he Framers, in perhaps their most important
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the
people, and chosen directly, not by the states, but by the
people. '' 2 9 Thus, with the adoption of the Constitution, a new
National Government was created that replaced the governmental
structure under the Articles of Confederation, 30 whereby the
states retained complete independence as sovereign nations bound
together only by treaties.31

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1853.
Id. at 1854.
Id.
Id. at 1863

30. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 178 1.

31. Id. art. 2. Article 2 states:
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The new Constitutional plan created a direct link, not between
the states and the national government, but between the people of
the United States and the National Government. Under this
arrangement, the states would be, in effect, a conduit, rather than
the fountainhead: "In the National Government, representatives
owe primary allegiance not to the people of a state, but to the
people of the Nation."' 32 It is no original power of a state to
appoint national representatives, and therefore despite the
Constitution's silence, "[n]o state can say, that it has reserved,
what it never possessed. " 33 The people's right to elect
representatives to the National Legislature was a new right,
arising from the Constitution itself.
Moreover, even if the states possessed some original power
over congressional qualifications, the text and structure of the
Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and the basic
principles of our democratic system, demonstrate that the
qualifications clauses were intended to preclude the states from
exercising any power over qualifications and to fix the
qualifications in the Constitution as exclusive. Totally absent
from the convention and ratification debates is any assertion that
the states had the power to add qualifications. 34 To be sure, the
question of term limits, or "rotation," was a source of some
controversy, but was ultimately rejected as "an absurd species of
ostracism." 35 The debates also underscored the Framers' interest
in having uniform qualifications, thereby emphasizing merit over
qualifications such as wealth, birth, religious faith, or civil
profession. 36

Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, an independence, and every
Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.
Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1855.
Id. at 1854.
Id. at 1859.
Id. at 1860.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (Madison); U.S. Term Limits, Inc.. 115 S.

Ct. 1842, 1847 (1995).
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The Framers were clearly distrustful of the states, expressing a
profound fear of possible interference by the states with federal
elections. Although the Constitution gave the states the power to
regulate the time, place, and manner of holding National
elections, 37 the Framers created a safeguard against state abuse
by giving Congress the power to alter any state regulations
relating to the holding of federal elections. 38 As the majority
opinion cogently explained: "In light of the Framers' evident
concern that states would try to undermine the National
Government, they could not have intended states to have the
power to set qualifications." ' 39 It is therefore "anomalous" and
"inconceivable" that the Constitution would give Congress the
power to assure that federal elections would be held, but then
give states the power to set qualifications in such a way as to
ensure that no candidate would be qualified for office.
Further, the contemporaneous state practice with respect to
qualifications and term limits reinforced the majority's position.
At the time of our founding, states retained property
qualifications for their own state elected officials, yet placed no
such qualifications on their congressional representatives. 40
Moreover, despite widespread support and use of state term
limits, no state sought to impose term limits on its own federal
representatives .41
Finally, the majority rejected the argument that the Arkansas
amendment is not a true qualification, but rather, is a ballot
access initiative. Constitutional rights, said the majority, are not
so easily evaded; they would be of little value if they could be
indirectly subverted. 42 Moreover, the clearly expressed intent of
37. Id. at 1857.
38. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. This clause states: "The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature; but the Congress may at any time
by law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators." Id.
39. Id. at 1858.
40. Id. at 1865 n.33.
41. Id. at 1866.
42. Id. at 1867.
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is a self-acknowledged

effort to

disqualify long-term congressional incumbents from further
service, rather than to place reasonable restrictions on access to
the ballot.4 3 Nor does the hypothetical possibility of a write-in
campaign cure the constitutional defect. Such possibility is
nothing more than a "faint glimmer." 4 4 Also, "allowing states to

evade the Qualifications Clauses by 'dress[ing] eligibility to stand
for Congress in ballot access clothing' trivializes the basic
45
principles of our democracy that underlie those Clauses."
In conclusion, observed the majority, allowing states to adopt
term limits for congressional service would effect a fundamental

change in the constitutional framework. 46 Whether or not such a
change may be a laudable initiative, it can come about only
through the Amendment procedures contained in Article V. 4 7

The Framers' belief that qualifications be fixed reflects their
understanding that although chosen by separate constituencies,
43. ARK. CONST. amend. 73 pmbl. (Michie Supp. 1995). The Arkansas
legislature found that long-term incumbents "become preoccupied with
reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people," leading to a
system which is "less free, less competitive, and less representative than the
system established by the Founding Fathers." Id.
44. Id. at 1868. See U.S. Term Linits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1868 n.43. The
Supreme Court noted that since 1913 (year that the Seventeenth Amendment
was ratified), only one out of over 1,300 Senate elections have been won by a
write-in candidate. Id. In the House of Representatives, five write-in
candidates have been successful out of 20,000 elections since 1900. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 1871.
47. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V states in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution.
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode
of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; ....
Id.; U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1871, n.50 (citing to previous
constitutional amendments in the area of voting rights such as direct election of
senators, extension of suffrage to women, prohibition against poll taxes,
lowering the age requirement to vote to eighteen).
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when people are elected to Congress they are "not merely
delegates appointed by separate, sovereign states," but rather
"servants of the people of the United States." 4 8
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy relied principally on
the same fundamental democratic principles. He observed that the
"whole people of the United States asserted their political identity
'4 9
and unity of purpose when they created the federal system."
The dissent's position suggesting otherwise, Kennedy said.
"'might be construed to disparage the republican character of the
National Government. '"50 The Framers, according to Kennedy,
"split the atom of sovereignty," establishing two orders of
government and giving citizens two political capacities, one state
and one federal. 5 1 Although the National Government has limited
powers, and must be held within those boundaries, when it
intrudes upon matters reserved to the states, the converse is also
true. It was the Framers' intent that there be no state interference
with the most basic relation between the National Government
52
and its citizens, the selection of legislative representatives.
Moreover, said Kennedy, if the Arkansas amendment were
allowed, it would have the "incongruous" result of burdening the
rights of resident voters in federal elections based on the manner
in which they had earlier exercised it. 53 "If the majority of voters
had been successful in selecting a candidate, they would be
penalized from exercising that same right in the future." 54 States
may not, according to Kennedy, burden the exercise of federal
55
rights in this manner.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, has been
characterized as carelessly worded, and breathtakingly

48. Id. at 1871.
49. Id. at 1872.

50. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

53. Id. at 1874 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
54. Id.

55. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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perverse. 56 The dissent argued, in essence, that the Constitution's
silence on the power of states to prescribe eligibility requirements
for membership in Congress "raises no bar to action by the States
or the people. " 57 Declaring that the Court's majority
"misunderstands the notion of reserved powers," Justice Thomas
"start[ed] with some first principles."58 One of these "first
principles" contained a remarkable passage that could have been
written by Jefferson Davis or John Calhoun on the eve of the
Civil War: "The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is
the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent
59
of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."
The dissent fundamentally disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the Tenth Amendment could only reserve to states
those powers that existed before the Constitution's ratification.
State governments were doing the reserving, Thomas maintained,
and it is "incoherent to assert that the people of the States could
not reserve any powers that they had not previously
controlled." 60 The dissent conceded that delegations of power to
the states, or prohibitions of the exercise of state power, need not
be expressly stated in the Constitution but may arise by
"necessary implication." 61 The resolution of such questions
depends on a fair construction of the Constitution. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that when the federal government
exercises powers expressly or implicitly granted to it, such as the
power to establish a federal bank, the Court in the landmark case
of McCulloch v. Maryland62 correctly held that the Supremacy
Clause 63 bars any state from interfering with the exercise of such
56. Jeffrey Rosen, Terminated: U.S. Supreme Court Overturns States'
CongressionalTerm Limits, NEW REPUBLIC, June 12, 1995, at 12.

57. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1876.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states in pertinent

part: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1996], Art. 8

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

64
power, as would be the case if a state taxed a national bank.
However, nothing in McCulloch conflicts with the proposition
that, in the absence of any express or necessarily implied
delegation of power to the federal government, the people of a
single state are disabled from prescribing qualifications for their
own representatives in Congress.65
The dissent also took issue with the majority's suggestion that
the Framers intended a "direct link" between Congress and the
people, thereby bypassing the states. The crucial link, Thomas
wrote, is between the representatives from each state and the
people of that state. 66 Thus, according to the dissent, "the people
of Georgia have no say over whom the people of Massachusetts
67
select to represent them in Congress."
The dissent construed the Qualifications Clauses as imposing
minimum eligibility requirements. The democratic principles that
contributed to the Framers decision to withhold from Congress
the power to prescribe qualifications for its own members did not
deprive the people of the states of their reserved authority to set
eligibility requirements for their own members. 68 The text of the
Qualifications Clauses is not by its terms an exclusive
formulation; it merely establishes minimum standards of
competence. 69 Plainly, the dissent argued, the people of other
states could complain if the people of Arkansas decided to send a
6-year-old to Congress, but the Constitution gives the people of
other states no basis to complain if the people of Arkansas elect a
freshman representative in preference to a long-term
70
incumbent.
The dissent also attempted to draw a distinction between the
action of the people in amending their state constitutions, and the

64. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 361-62.
65. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1995) (citing Tenth
Amendment in support of the proposition that the States can determine
qualification of their own elected representatives).
66. Id. at 1882 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1886 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1887.
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action of a state legislature in prescribing qualifications:
"Observing that the Framers specifically provided for Senators to
be chosen by the state legislatures and for Representatives to be
chosen by the people," the dissent understood this distinction as a
recognition by the Framers of the "meaningful difference
between direct action by the people of each state and action by
their state legislatures." 71 Thus, even if state legislatures are
barred from prescribing qualifications for Congress, such
requirements imposed by the people themselves are perfectly
constitutional. 72

The majority's reliance on contemporary state practice is also
unhelpful, according to the dissent. First, Article VI expressly
prohibits states from imposing religious qualifications. 73 This
reference, the dissent contended, would seem to undermine the
majority's position that the Article I qualifications were meant to
be exclusive. 74 Further, rotation out of office was increasingly
disfavored on policy grounds because it was believed that states
lacked the power to require it. 75 Third, property qualifications,
although widely required for state legislators, "may simply have
seemed unnecessary" for federal legislators. 76 It was much more
likely that a pauper would be able to secure one of the hundreds
of seats in a state legislature than that he would be able to secure
one of the relatively few seats in the House of Representatives.
The dissent also chided the majority for its radical holding
which would allow congressional candidates who are mentally
incompetent, currently in prison, or who have vote-fraud
convictions. 77 Finally, the dissent argued that the Arkansas
71. Id. at 1893 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

72. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Constitution
deprives the people of each State of the power to prescribe eligibility
requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress. The
Constitution is simply silent on this question.").
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3. This section states: "[N]o religious Test

shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office of public Trust under the
United States." Id.
74. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1906 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1908, n.37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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amendment is not really a term limit, but simply a ballot access
restriction; any person can seek election through the write-in
process. 7 8 The amendment is simply "leveling the playing field."
Even though the Court rebuffed the challenge, the significance
of this case should not be underestimated. If the Court had
upheld state-imposed term limits, seventy two House members
79
from seven states could not have run for reelection after 1996.
More ominously, according to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, the
dissenting opinion, if accepted, would have posed a significant
threat to national unity. He said:
If the Constitution's failure to nail down a given matter with
absolute finality becomes an excuse for the states to adopt
measures that will be upheld by the Supreme Court regardless of
how much they may undermine the integrity of the union, then
the ability of the country to hold together in difficult times may
be seriously endangered. 80
The majority noted, at the conclusion of its opinion, the
distinction between the wisdom of term limit laws and their
constitutionality. Twenty-three states had imposed term limit
laws, 81 and the "movement" continues to have strong populist
appeal and powerful momentum. Whether this represents a grassroots revolt against what is perceived as a despotic Washington.
or simply a recognition that voters dislike and distrust careerism
in politics, the decision in Term Limits is probably not the last
word on the subject.
The House of Representatives mirrored the action of the
Supreme Court last March by failing to achieve the necessary
two-thirds vote for a constitutional amendment. 82 The
Republican-controlled body thereby reneged on item number ten
78. Id. at 1884-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. See Katherine Q. Seelye, Decision Opens Door for 72 To Seek Reelection to House, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at Al.
80. W. John Moore, Pleading the 10th, NAT. LAW JOURNAL. July 29,
1995, at 1940.
81. See Charles Fried, Forvard: Revolution?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13

(1995).
82. 141 CONG. REC. H3941-03, R3. House Republicans fell 61 votes short
of passing the resolution for congressional term limits (227-204). Id.
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of its Contract With America. Nevertheless, the issue is very
much alive. One Senator has suggested imposing term limits on
the basis of residency, and barring anyone from seeking reelection who has been absent from his or her state for more than
180 days a year for twelve consecutive years. 83 It has also been
suggested that states could impose mandatory pledges on
congressional candidates that would require them to say how long
they intended to serve. 84 Also, states might be able to indicate on
the actual ballot whether a particular candidate favors or opposes
term limits. There is, of course, the possibility that the states will
organize a Constitutional Convention.
The Supreme Court's renewed attraction to the Tenth
Amendment has aided and abetted what has been referred to as
the modem American Devolution. Employing the rhetoric of
federalism, Congress has moved to eliminate programs involving
unfunded mandates, to shift power back to the states in the form
of block grants, to abolish the 55 mile per hour speed limit, and
to eliminate or soften a variety of federal environmental
regulations. Inspired by the Supreme Court's decision last Term
in United States v. Lopez, 85 a spate of lawsuits have challenged,
86
sometimes successfully, federal statutes such as the Brady Bill,
the car-jacking law, 87 the abortion-clinic-access law, 8 8 and the
motor voter registration act.89
83. Kenneth J. Cooper and Helen Dewar, Ruling Isn't End of Fight, Term

Limits Backers Vow: Senate Defeat Likely, but Some See Issue for '96,
WASHINGTON POST, May 23, 1995, at A6.
84. See James Kuhnhenn, Ruling Alters Tactics, But Resolve is Firm:
Term-Limit Backers Consider Options After Mond&'s Decision, KANSAS CITY
STAR, May 23, 1995, at Al.

85. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is
invalid as beyond Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), (t) (Supp. 1995); Frank v. United States, N.Y.
L.J., March 26, 1996, at 25 (2d Cir. March 15, 1996) ("IT]he commerce
power of the United States is almost certainly broad enough to support such
legislation.") (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. 1995). See United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d
547 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Lopez, holding that

carjacking is exactly the type of economic activity which Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause.
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Although the decision in Term Limits served to brake somewhat
the Tenth Amendment's momentum, the Court has shown a
willingness to consider, under a broadened and more flexible
framework of state power, questions that seemed for generations
to be settled. This suggests that the revived debate over what has
been called the "oldest constitutional question" -- namely, the
meaning of federalism -- is just beginning.

88. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (Supp. 1995). See Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck,
67 F.3d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of provisions
providing for a 15 foot buffer zone around the entrance of an abortion clinic
where only two "counselors" may stand in the zone and speak to patients
unless privacy is requested).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (Supp. 1995). See Association of Community
Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 75 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 1996). Illinois argued
that it cannot be forced to administer a federal law promoting voter
registration. Id. at 793. The law was held constitutional pending the state's
approval. 1d; Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1412 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 815 (1996) (denying certiorari to California
Governor Pete Wilson's suit challenging the constitutionality of the Voter
Registration Act).
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